Introduction
To begin an exposition on the state of canon law with a poetic passage from the prophet Isaiah is unusual. But the allegory of the vineyard offers a good introduction into the inner core of my study. Yahweh built a vine yard and he created a protective enclosure for it, so that the life hidden in the vine may unfold and bring fruit. Isaiah sees a neat distinction be tween the external provisions (the clearing of the soil and the building of the tower) and the internal wealth (the vines bursting with life).
All that constitutes the supporting structures of the vineyard-the walls, the beds, the paths, the watch tower-they all are meant to provide protection for the vines so that they may grow and produce an abundant harvest of grapes. They are necessary but not life giving. Life is in the plants, and only there.
It is also so in the Church. Structures and organizations are needed to provide an environment for life to unfold and expand. But life is in the people-only there and nowhere else.
Concerning the Church, every allegory, of course, is an approximation of a reality that is too mysterious to be expressed in our limited concepts and images. Nonetheless, the allegory of the vineyard, when judiciously applied, is a good way of representing the relationship between law and life in God's own domain, which is the Church.
The Theme
The more precise description of the subject matter of my discourse is in the subtitle: Sacrae disciplinae leges: Forty Years after the Council.1 It indicates a comparative study. The terms to be compared are, on the one side, the corpus of canon law as it is contained in the Code o f Canon Law promulgated in 1983 and on the other side, the event and the "deter minations" of Vatican Council II and their consequences. A broad topic-by any measure. Teams of experts, even if they were locked up for years in an ivory tower, could hardly do justice to it. But there is no need to be discouraged: within this broad field, I can focus on a few se lected ideas and facts, probe them for a better understanding, and then form a few reasonable conclusions that need not be final but good enough to make some progress in the intelligence of our Church and in the appreciation of our laws.
My task is then to inquire as to how far our structures and laws mea sure up to the vision of the council? Or inquire as to how far the council and canon law form a unity-in integrated harmony.
In the search for the answer (or answers), I shall proceed in four steps:
The first part of my exposition could be called "due disclosure." In it, I wish to clarify some key concepts and expressions that will regularly occur throughout my exposition. My intention, however, is not to give standard definitions-which otherwise I do not fail to respect-but to ac count for my own understanding of certain theological realities and legal institutions.
The second part will be a historical presentation of the state of the Church and of the canon law before the council.
The third part will focus on the event of the council; it will be a provi sional image since the significance of the council is still unfolding.
The fourth part will assess the state of the Church and of canon law after the council; it will be a report on a present reality in which we all are involved.
The conclusion will be no more than an expression of hope: good ideas have a resilience that no human power can take away.
Part One: Key Concepts: Clues to Understanding.
Before letting this small lexicon unfold, let me insist that I am offering only partial descriptions of rich-divine and human-realities of which we do not have a comprehensive perception.
Church
Who are the church? The church is the people of God, all of them, full of life-giving energy that wants to expand.2 This energy leads them to fresh insights about their faith and gives them strength for evangelical deeds. They are the recipients of God's gifts that are distributed directly to individual people according to God's good pleasure. They all enjoy a fundamental equality flowing from the sacraments: baptism has made them God's children; confirmation has made them one in the Spirit; and the Eucharist has made them one in the risen body of Christ. According to the testimony of Vatican Councils I and II, they together are the keep ers of the sacred memory of the Christ event, and they together have the wisdom to build the Church.3 What are the "notes" (characteristics) o f the Church? We know that the Church is one, holy, catholic, and apostolic-they are the notes we profess in the creed.5 The church has, however, other characteristics, not professed in the creed but no less true: it is resilient and it is fragile.
At this point a couple o f cautionary remarks are in order:
The church is resilient due to divine assistance. The people of God, as long as they hold together in communion (and God will always preserve the unity of the "rest of Israel"), cannot lose the memory of God's saving deeds in Christ. Nor can they lose the way to the Kingdom. We believe in a resilient Church.
The Church is fragile because it is composed of human beings. Yes, the Spirit protects the assembly; but the same Spirit does not take away the human frailty of its members. While as a collectivity they cannot lose the apostolic message, no divine guarantee exists that in practical matters they will always observe the highest degree of prudence. Anyone who doubts it should read a history of the Church from cover to cover; his or her doubt will be dispelled soon and forever. Now, ecclesiastical lawshuman laws by definition-are the fragile Church's creation. It follows that some laws may fall short of serving the Church well-or may even do bad service to the community.6 We believe in a fragile Church. 5 The notes point to the perfection of the eschatological church. We should add that the pilgrim church of Christ is also divided, unholy, at times and in places too particular and lacking in apostolic simplicity. The Church is the assembly of sinners redeemed who are on the way to being transformed to the image of Christ.
6 It does not follow that the mark of the Spirit is absent in the legal system, or that some laws do not reach a high degree of prudence. Such an assumption would be incorrect-or downright silly. 
Council
In part three, I shall speak extensively of Vatican Council II. At this point, I wish only to draw attention to a distinction: every council in his tory brought forth a proclamation and every council was an event. This distinction is particularly significant for Vatican Council II.7
Every ecumenical council in the history of the Church has produced a "proclamation" concerning some point or points of the doctrine of the faith. They are objective propositions; we find them in collections usu ally entitled as "The Decrees of Ecumenical Councils."8 Further, at the same time every ecumenical council was an "event" which brought a life cycle of the Church to its closure and initiated a new one; each council was an end and a beginning. Beyond its teaching function (the intellec tual enlightenment of the Church), councils always (or mostly) left an existential impact on the Church that sometimes "reverberated" for decades or centuries.
The proclamations of Vatican Council II have been, and will be, de bated for a long time to come. Less attention is being paid to the council as an event.
Theology
In this exposition the term "theology" means more than the art and craft of expounding the doctrine of faith in well-chiseled concepts and precise propositions. While such mental skill and agility is certainly needed in the Church, the true foundation of any theological enterprise is in wisdom that speaks of ineffable mysteries apprehended by faith. Such wisdom should play a principal role in discovering Christian values that the community should appropriate. This is to say that an intuitive sensus fidei, or a "supernatural instinct" should be numbered among the sources of canon law.9
Canon Law
In colloquial conversations the term "canon law' is used-and abused-in several senses. At one end of the gamut, the speaker may be referring to petty regulations for the vexation of the faithful; at the other end he or she may have in mind the God-given structures of the Church. Authentic canon law (that is, the compound of ecclesiastical laws) is be tween these extremes: it is neither petty nuisance nor divine ordinance. It is a necessary human instrument in a divinely founded community to bring good balances into the operations of the group.
Such an instrument is indispensable. No community, not even a com munity of God's children, can function without good order.10 Further, no spiritual charism given to an assembly can survive in the vicissitudes of history unless it is supported and protected by legal structures and norms.11 9 Cf. Lumen gentium 12: "The people unfailingly adhere to this faith, penetrate it more deeply through right judgment, and apply it more fully in daily life." This is briefly the reason why there should be room in the Church for customary law.
10 There is order even in the holy Trinity: the Son proceeds from the Father and the Spirit from the Father and (through) the Son.
11 To accept the "church spiritual" but to reject the "church institutional" does not make sense within the Christian dispensation: it runs counter to the dynamics of the divine initiative in the Incarnation. Besides, there is no stability in history without a soundly built institution; if a spiritual movement does not become "earthly" in visible structures, it is The best definition of canon law (ecclesiastical law) is given by its purpose: it is a system of structures and norms to secure freedom for the people to receive unimpeded the gifts of the Spirit and it is a system of structures and norms to secure freedom for the Spirit to dispense unim peded his gifts. Here we find the dignity of ecclesiastical legislators: they are called to create freedom for the citizens of God's Kingdom and for his Spirit-an awesome task. Once freedom is created, life can sprout and unfold.
Theology and Canon Law
A question often raised is: how do theology and canon law relate to each other? Which one of the two has priority? The answer is that they ought to operate in an essential organic unity-each retaining its own characteristics. Theology operates on the abstract level: it has priority at the planning stage because it determines a value to be appropriated and it gives mean ing to the law. Canon law operates on the concrete level: it provides norms of action in the existential order and it contributes directly to the building and well being of the Kingdom.
While a vision must precede every reasonable action, a vision still re mains within the realm of theory. When a command is issued for an ac tion, it is to shape reality. And reality has its own God-given priority.
For this reason structures and laws cannot be handled lightly. They have a priority that no theory can possess: they deal with existence. The actual building of a house has its own priority over the blueprint of the same house. But a law not grounded in a value is like a house built on sand; it is bound to collapse.
In the Church, canon law has an importance that no theory can match. It deals with the real existing social body.
The very question of priority is a misconceived query: there is one sin gle process that goes from a vision to an operation: every stage in the process plays an indispensable role.
Conversion
The concept of conversion will repeatedly return and can cause confu sion. For this reason, I wish to stress that-as a rule-I use the term not bound to pass away; history proves it abundantly. As we humans cannot be pure spirits, a human community cannot be purely spiritual.
in the sense of abandoning the old faith and turning to some new fan tasies but in the sense of a "turning around" within the framework of our tradition and reaching a deeper intelligence of faith and a wiser path in the obedience of faith.
My conceptual clarifications-a sort of apologia for giving a special sense to common terms and expressions-are now concluded.
Before entering, however, into the historical part a disclaimer is useful-to dispel misgivings-should they exist.
Nowhere in this exposition do I intend to be either conserva tive or progressive; my aim is to draw conclusions from verifi able evidence, or, to tell a story to the best o f my ability subject to completion or correction as new evidence arises or as we reach better insights into the available data. To be as a matter o f prin ciple either conservative or progressive is to confess an ideolog ical prejudice that neither faith nor reason should tolerate. Part Two: Before the Council The State o f The Church
On the eve of the council the Church was bursting with divine energy but lacking balance in its human operations. Let me call on an authentic witness, who is not one to be taken lightly. The circumstances of his tes timony add additional weight to his words. The witness is Pius XI; the time is a few days before his death.
The late Alex Carter, former bishop of Sault Ste. Marie, in Ontario, Canada, reports in his Memoirs an impromptu exhortation that Pius XI addressed in 1939 to the students of the Canadian College in Rome, on the fiftieth anniversary of their College. Carter was one of the students who were present. The pope's words as quoted by Carter:
You are the young priests who have come to Rome. You are going back to Canada and will continue to build the Church there. I do not place any limits on the providence of God, but I am sure that my life expectancy is very short. I want you to take this message away with you. The church, the mystical body of Christ, has become a monstrosity. The head is very large, but the body is shrunken. You, the priests, must rebuild that body of the church and the only way that you can rebuild it is to mobilize the lay people. You must call upon the lay people to become, along with you, the witnesses of Christ. You must call them especially to bring Christ back to the workplace, to the marketplace.12
Carter comments that: "This powerful message was like a Last Will and Testament of the Pope. As a matter of fact that was his last public au dience. All audiences were cancelled the following day and he died not long afterward." 13
The successor of Pius XI was Pius XII. While he "opened some win dows," (e.g., he liberated biblical scholars from their intellectual captiv ity), overall he continued with the trend of centralization.14 On the eve of the council, the Church, the mystical body of Christ, was suffering from an internal dislocation of vital forces. Virtually all the local churches and the people of God at large were reduced to varying degrees of passivity.
For example, individual dioceses were allowed little initiative; the non-ordained faithful (I prefer that term to "laity") were not entitled to proclaim the good news without a mandate from the hierarchy. The commonly held "official" doctrine was that the priests received their power of jurisdiction from the bishop. And the bishops received their power to govern from the pope.
Behind the situation was an understanding of the constitution of the Church which was never defined as a matter of faith, yet was operative in conceiving laws, in issuing administrative orders, and in setting policies: God designed the Church in such a way that all good things, especially intelligence of faith and prudent decisions, should descend from above, from the person of the pope, the Vicar of Christ.
In this understanding there was little space for creativity at any lower level: on the level of the non-ordained, the priests, and the bishops. Hard practices flowed from this understanding: the Holy See became ever more the near exclusive source of doctrinal insights and practical initia tives not only in the person of the pope but also in the curial offices.
While the Church may have been rich in energies, the restrictive struc tures and norms, however, left little room for their activation. How did the situation arise?
12 Alex Carter, A Canadian Bishop's Memoirs (North Bay, Ontario:Tomiko Publica tions 1994) 50.
13 Ibid., 51. 14 Ever since the pope became the "prisoner of the Vatican" in 1870, a new cult of the person of the pope began to emerge. In earlier times when Catholic people made a pil grimage to Rome, they went there "to visit Peter and Paul," to do homage to the apostles.
The trend toward a highly centralized government originated with the policies of Gregory VII at the end of the eleventh century.* 15 He intended to strengthen the bishops' independence vis-a-vis the secular princes, which was a needed and eventually successful reform. The leading role of the pope in this movement, however, led to a new understanding of the role of the primacy. A strictly monarchical government away from the old tradition of synodality was in the making. The next great impetus to centralization came from the Council of Trent, in the sixteenth century. The Church in Northern Europe was fragmenting; and the obvious rem edy was unity of strategy, command, and action. Only the See of Rome could create and sustain such unity. In the nineteenth century, Vatican Council I provided significant doctrinal support for the centralizing ac tivities of the papacy-although without canonizing them as the only way of life for the Church.16 There is no "reason of faith" why the process of administrative centralization should be regarded as based on an authentic doctrinal development.
Over so many centuries, however, a misguided theological opinion has become the guide for practice: all enlightenment and good things de scend from above. The task of the people (and of the episcopate) is to obey the descending commands.
The State of Canon Law We need to remember the principle that canon law is within the fragile side o f the Church and that the human legislator is not indefectible in prudential matters.
Modern pilgrims go to Rome "to see the pope." The visit of the diocesan bishops ad limina apostolorum is widely perceived by all concerned as a visit ad limina camerae papae. Of course, it is right and just that believing people should show respect for Peter's successor; but a "cult of personality" in a secular sense is not fitting for God's people-it is not the style of God's court. In praise of canon law, we must acknowledge that canon law has doneand continues to do-an immense service to the Church. Just to mention a recent example: the 1917 code established concordance among discor dant canons; it brought order, clarity, and legal security into the life of the community. So did and does the 1983 code.
Such praise has been voiced many times by prelates and scholars; I concur wholeheartedly. The system, however, was not-is not-without problems.
Canon law has become the principal instrument of centralization.
Over some nine hundred years an immense system of administrative structures has been built up that gradually led to a highly centralized government. To describe this history, a whole book would be necessary, but the final result is obvious. Whatever advantages such a style of gov ernment may have, the doctrine of faith does not demand it; and it is not the only way the Church can be governed.
Canonical jurisprudence has lost its vital link with theology; it became a victim o f "canonical nominalism. "
The late Gerard Fransen, a much-respected professor of history of canon law at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, was the first to recog nize and explain how the disease of positivism came to affect canon law.17 In 1564, after the Council of Trent and to safeguard the integrity of the council's decisions, Pius IV forbade the publication of any "com mentaries, glossaries, annotations, scholia, or interpretations of any kind concerning the Council's decrees." 18 This was the beginning of "canonical nominalism"-to use Fransen's expression. Canon lawyers had to content themselves with the task of paraphrasing the official documents-without bringing any inquiring spirit into their work. With one stroke, that is, with one papal bull, the great tradition of "raising questions" that animated research in the Mid dle Ages was terminated. The method of Magister Gratianus who sought justification for every canon, the playfully serious method of sic et non invented, practiced, and taught by Abelard, the incisive inquiries through alternating denials and affirmations by Aquinas were declared out of 17 See Gerard Fransen, "L'application des decrets du Concile de Trente. Les debuts d'un nominalisme canonique," L 'annee canonique 27 (1983) 5-16.
18 DS 1849.
bounds. It was not the business of canon lawyers to search for values be hind the canons. Unity-a value-had its own exorbitant price.19 2 0
As a result, for some four hundred years canon lawyers, perhaps with out realizing what they were doing, operated within the narrow bound aries of legal positivism-well before the secular philosophers invented and professed it. First, they did it by imposition, then they continued by sheer force of habit and tradition. Anyone who wants proof should con sult the standard manuals before Vatican Council II with this question in mind: just how many times do the authors examine the laws critically for the wisdom they contain-or for the law's connection with the founda tional values of our Christian tradition-as such values are evidenced in the Scriptures, patristic literature, the pronouncements of the great coun cils, and so forth. The manuals will speak for themselves.
Canon law has become static, ahistorical, and adverse to development.
Every legal system needs stability; otherwise the community suffers from uncertainty. But every legal system must be aware of the flow of history around it and have ways and means of introducing changes. If not, the system becomes a rigid monument and not a life-supporting
We all know the principle "change in the law is odious," mutatio legis odiosa. We know equally well that if a law is not in step with history, it becomes irrelevant-or odious. We need both stability and flexibility. Virtue lies in a right balance between the two, and the balance needs to change with changing times. An age of rapid (social) developments may demand rapid adaptations in the legal system.
The two great legal systems of the West, classical Roman law and English common law, were born in, and shaped by, historical communi 19 A reasonable and legitimate question: why is there so much aversion to canon law throughout the Catholic Church? A tentative answer: because our people, blessed with a sense of faith, instinctively sense that some (many?) of our laws are poorly serving values of a higher order.
20 While an intense development of doctrine marked the life of the Church in modern times, especially in ecclesiology, canon law has not sufficiently benefited from it. The re sult is a lack of balance in the social life of the community: its understanding of the mys teries is more advanced than the principles of its operations. The laws of the Church can play a vital role only if they consistently affirm and support theological values; otherwise they are a noisy gong or clanging cymbal (cf. 1 Cor 13:1). To accomplish this task, there must be a continuous interplay between doctrine and practice.
ties. The developing structures and norms responded to the emerging needs of the society. Laws are an integral part of our continually devel oping humanity.
The quest for order in the Christian church was also a response to the dynamics of history: to events within and without the community. Canon law cannot be otherwise. It cannot be a set of rules carved on an immo bile monument that successive generations may read but never regard as organic part of their life. Now, when a code of laws is promulgated with well-chiseled rules and seemingly intended for all times, it risks becom ing like a monument that has no vital connection with the community. Every legal system must include provisions for the on-going renewal of the law.
Civic communities avoid this problem: they have an on-going legisla ture. In the church we have the code but (in the practical order) no or ganism with the task of watching the needs of the community and proposing changes. Whenever needs arise (needs that laws could rem edy), they cause tensions, then they lead to painful crises, finally they may lead to explosions.21
Canon law has cut itself off from secular (human) wisdom.
Jurisprudence is a human science; canon lawyers do not have the priv ilege of being the best at it. Once, canon lawyers and civil lawyers prac ticed jurisprudence together. This is not the case today.
Ever since the Renaissance, secular jurisprudence made immense strides-and progress-in such matters as freedom of conscience, re spect for human rights, impartial courts, speedy administration of jus tice, responsibility for the common welfare, and so forth. Canon law re mained mostly untouched by such developments; it remained attached to late scholasticism. Again, one should consult our manuals on "Philoso phy of Law" used before the council: they are innocent of modernity. On the basis of knowledge gained from them, no one could carry on an in telligent conversation about the law with a well-intentioned contempo rary secular thinker.
21
This is exactly what happened when the crisis of sexual abuse descended on the Church. It was coming for some time, and there was no adequate preventive legislation. A sensible system of the "visitation of the dioceses" could have discovered the problems much earlier and could have taken necessary remedies. Any binding system of visitation remains unacceptable until this day
Part Three: The Council
Every council is an end and a beginning: it concludes an era and opens another. Vatican Council II was no exception: it was a watershed in the Church's history. Yet, it had a particular character: it was more futureoriented than any other council that occurred before it.
The Council as an Event
The council was an event of conversion. To identify the extent of this conversion is not difficult: the terminus a quo can be found in the nu merous and mostly unimaginative proposals submitted before the coun cil by the worldwide episcopate, the terminus ad quern is recorded in the final documents of the council. 
And let me add immediately and forcefully-as forcefully as the style can bear it: no one can appropriate the meaning o f the council without going through the same process o f conversion.

It is not enough to achieve an intellectual understanding o f the texts; that is, o f the concepts and propositions in the documents. It is not enough to implement an intellectual position through new policies and ordinances. To appropriate the council means to enter with mind and heart into a new horizon; it is to move out o f the Tridentine environment and start living in a hitherto
The council fathers were-and we are-called to move into a new field o f vision (into a "new life-environment" would be a better description); where they-we-must think and act in a dif ferent manner. Such transition (or transformation) is always painful; it means to move away from the security o f the "known " toward the threatening insecurity o f the "unknown." It is not purely external (like settling under a different roof) but it de mands an internal change in our personality; we must not "cling " to our familiar habits o f thoughts and operations but must "empty ourselves" to make room fo ra "new creature"-or, in the case o f the Church, to make room fo r a newly fashioned community.
At the council, behind the ideological battles witnessed by the speeches, vital fears played their role. To say so is not to reduce the conciliar debates to some silly psychology; it is simply to state that the participants were human beings; believers, yes, but human beings. For instance, to move from the clear and distinct certainty that an excessive interpretation o f papal infallibility can give into the disturbing complexity o f a synodal and colle gial decision-making process can be an agonizing journey.
By way o f anticipation, I may already point out that when we reach the issue o f "how far does the post-conciliar legislation re flect the mind o f the council? " the right question will be "how fa r does the new code bear witness to the great event o f conversion, and how fa r is it an instrument o f conversion for the whole community?" Let us not hide an additional problem: the insights o f the council are so deep and far reaching that they can be grasped only slowly-even for those who were present at it. In other terms: the meaning of the council keeps unfolding in our minds and hearts ever since its closure. This should not be surprising: a traveler may well see a mountain in a distance and perceive its outstanding features without having a detailed knowledge o f its complex reality; in the same way the pilgrim Church (repre sented by the bishops at a council) may see a mystery in its out-line and affirm its existence without an immediate perception o f its depth and breadth.
To work on the unfolding o f the mystery remains the task o f the coming generations.
The council as an event of conversion that took place in the minds and hearts of the participants-slowly and painfully, over the seasons of four years. The principal protagonist of this event was the gigantic figure of pope John XXIII-ilpapa buono, "the good pope," as he became known worldwide. His stature is likely to increase; time will do its work in pre serving the substantial over many accidentals. When blessed John XXIII convoked Vatican Council II, he reversed a trend of nine hundred years of centralization.23 He was "inspired" to do so-or so he confessed it. He did it single handedly, not withstanding "prudent advice" to the contrary.24
He knew there were problems with the Church. He could have decided on a series of encyclicals instructing the people on what to do. After all, he was the supreme teacher. He did the opposite. He called on the univer sal episcopate. Then the bishops came from every corner of the world, and-eventually-understood him and became aware of their own task.25
The episcopal college, presided by the bishop of Rome, fully opera tional, reversed a current coming from the depth of past centuries, and opened the way for a new tide of energies.
No wonder that Vatican Council II does not fit easily into any category of councils. It was convoked in relatively serene times to "update" the Church and to bring about an aggiornamento. It was called not "to disperse" but "to gather" fresh insights into the permanent core of our tradition.
23 One is reminded of the exultant cry of the Psalmist: "The sea looked and fled, Jor dan turned back" (Ps 114:3). Pope John was certainly exultant on the evening of the open ing day of the council in his speech from the window of his study-in his joy he asked mothers to bring his caresses to their children. He foresaw a far-reaching impact of the council.
24 This trend of centralization led the Western branch of Christianity further and fur ther away from the Eastern one; the Eastern churches continued to operate collegially on the basis of the ancient doctrine of synodality.
25 The bishops began to grasp the pope's deepest intent when a few weeks into the council, they started to vindicate their own right to compose the documents. The voice of the universal episcopate-muted for so long-was heard again in the Church. The coun cil was coming to life; or life was (exuberantly) welling up in the episcopal college.
Because Vatican Council II was so unusual in its convocation, opera tion, and achievement, its reception by the universal Church cannot be but slow. It calls for the conversion of the whole Roman Catholic communion.26
Canon Law at the Council
On January 25, 1959, at St. Paul's basilica John XXIII named three projects that he intended to initiate and promote as organic parts of his aggiomamento: a diocesan synod for Rome, an ecumenical council, and the revision of canon law. Events progressed in that order. The diocesan synod for Rome was held and concluded in January 1960. The council was convoked and opened October 11, 1962. The work for the revision of canon law was initiated on March 29, 1963 when the pope appointed a commission of thirty cardinals, twenty one of them from the Roman curia.
As far as I know, the theme of "canon law at the council" has not at tracted the attention of any researcher-yet, such a history holds the clue to the understanding of the post conciliar developments. Since we have no conclusive study, I cannot do more than to indicate some pertinent questions to be investigated.
Question 1: Have the council fathers (the majority of them) realized that while during the council theological issues had to have priority; after the council legal structures and norms will be indispensable to promote the theological values asserted by the council? Question 2: Has the council done anything to assure that the Commis sion for the Revision of Canon Law will faithfully translate the vision of the council into legislation? (The council appointed a consilium to assure that the reform of the liturgy would follow the mind of the council.) Question 3: Is it of any significance that the better part of the members of the Commission for the Revision of the Code consisted of persons from the Curia that became known for regularly trying to oppose the ma jority of the council fathers, and by and large holding theological opin ions that the council discarded? Question 4: What was the interpretation of the council that the Com mission for the Revision of the Code injected into the composition of the 26 The receptions of the great councils were never instantaneous; those of the councils of Nicea, Chalcedon, and Trent were particularly slow. new canons? In other terms: what were the theological values they have consistently promoted and supported during the process of revision?
More questions could be raised. In truth, we are far from any compre hensive and sound historical knowledge.27 The best is to await a de tached study of "canon law at the Council."28
In this context, however, for the sake of historical accuracy and com pleteness, it must be recorded that one group displayed an unusual per spicacity: here is the report of a historian:
Immediately after the council, Opus Dei would participate very little in the new organisms created in the Vatican as an outcome of the most reformist aspects of the council (secretariats for unity, for non-Christians, for nonbelievers, etc.), which were pri marily occupied by the representatives of the most "open" or "advanced" currents, who were enjoying a wave of euphoria at that moment. These same "progressive" sectors, however, un dervalued the importance of another area, which they found un attractive and did not want to devote any time to: canon law. Opus Dei, on the other hand, fomented the cultivation of this dis cipline; the University of Navarre became the seedbed for a school of canonists, and from the very moment of the creation of the Committee on the Revision of Canon Law, Opus Dei took an active role in it.29 27 Anecdotal history is just that: anecdotal. Its value is limited. Yet, small events may have some significance and be precious indicators of hidden trends. It is fair to record them but they must be taken for what they are. With this proviso, I wish to recall two re marks by prominent persons. (1) During the council I had a conversation with Msgr. Alexandre Renard, then bishop of Versailles, later Cardinal Archbishop of Lyon. I men tioned that the reception of the council would depend largely on the new canon law. "Will the council do anything about it?"-I asked. His response was swift and to the point: "I do not care about canon law;" it is even more to the point in the original French "Je m 'en fiche de droit canonique. " Question: have some bishops (the council?) failed to realize the existential role of law to create the freedom necessary for the reception of the council? (2) Soon after the council, I heard Father Raimundo Bidagor, then recently named secretary of the Commission for the Revision of the Code of Canon Law, say in a small company of university professors that concerning the council "there was nothing to be grateful for." Question: what impact, if any, had his negative disposition toward the council on the pos itive work of revision that he had to organize and guide? After all, his charge was "to trans late" the conciliar ideas into legal norms. Later, it was commonly talked about in Rome that Paul VI himself realized the seriousness of the situation; and he called on Mgr Willy Onclin to become co-secretary-and speed up the revision.
28 The topic is fascinating; it is suitable for a doctoral dissertation. 29 This is a quote from Joan Estruch, Saints & Schemers: Opus Dei and its Paradoxes translated from the Catalan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 206. While the title
Part Four: after the Council The State o f the Church
In trying to sum up the history of the post-conciliar years-complex and confusing as they were-an image comes into my mind. Think of two mighty rivers-surging from distant sources-each full of energyflowing toward the ocean. If those two giants of currents meet at some point, what happens? Turbulence, on a mighty scale.
In the Church there was a current that originated some nine hundred years ago and was nourished and reinforced over the centuries to the eve of the council. It created its own "ethos. " The center was active, and the people at large led an existence of quiet passivity; people were given lit tle responsibility and they were directed toward seeking their salvation through blind obedience. Much of God's acre was lying fallow.
The event of Vatican Council II generated another current that opened the door for the recognition of God's gifts dispersed in the community and asked each one to accept responsibility and exercise creativity for the benefit of the whole.30 After the council the two currents met and clashed. The result was-and still is-turbulence among God's people. of the book is uncalled for and an incorrect translation of the Catalan original (L 'Opus Dei I les seves paradoxes), the book contains a great deal of information not otherwise avail able. Today Opus Dei has a flourishing Faculty of Canon Law in Rome as part of their Pontificia Universita della Santa Croce. Cardinal Julian Herranz, of Opus Dei, is the Pres ident of the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts. Their members seem to exercise a strong influence over the field of canon law-in legislation, interpreta tion, and implementation. The literary production of the members on the same field is im mense although the late historian Gerard Fransen would probably identify it as a continu ation of the post Tridentine trend of "canonical nominalism." The avowed intent of the "Navarra School" is to "exegete" the text of the law but not to critically evaluate it on the basis of theological values: once the legislator has spoken (the law has been promulgated), the task of the interpreter is to explain it but not to judge it with the help of scriptural, pa tristic, and other sources-which all transcend the law. The nature o f canon law, for this school, is the same as that of secular law; they differ only in the fact that canon law is sub ject to the ecclesiastical Magisterium while civil law is not. Other scholars do not find such a theory an adequate explanation of canon law because the norms of action in the Church are "saving norms;" they are an integral part of the grace-filled redeeming activ ity of the "saving community"-how could their nature ever be identical with the norms of a secular community that is the state?! The purpose of canon law is the salus animarum and it is generated by a religious group; the purpose of civil law is the temporal welfare of the citizens and it is created by secular organs. Now, if their purposes and generating sources are substantially different (one is heavenly, the other is earthly), how could their nature be the same? 30
We hear much about conservatives v. liberals in the Church; cf. above. The labels are misconceived, misplaced, and misleading. Today's "conservatives" are mostly cling-To receive the council meant to turn away from the security of the old and accept the insecurity of a new way of thinking and new manner of operating. It is more than to reform the liturgical rules. It is more than having a new Code of Canon Law. It is conversion.
The State of Canon Law
The greatest event, of course, was the publication of the revised Code of Canon Law in 1983 with the apostolic constitution, Sacrae disciplinae leges. This is what we have at the present, and we have it for the foresee able future.
Today, in the practical order, this legal system exercises a de facto pri ority over the theological vision of the council. The structures and the norms contained in the code (and the subsequent enactments comple menting them) are daily shaping the Church and directing its operations.
In fairness, praise should be given for what has been achieved. The council had its own impact on our legal system. But has there been a sub stantial aggiornamento?
To come to a fair judgment, let us return to the shortcomings that ex isted before the council and see how far they have been remedied.
Centralization.
If Pius XI redivivus visited the Church today, he would find little new evidence for changing his judgment. The "episcopal synod" that Paul VI initiated to identify critical issues in the life of the Church and provide some episcopal leadership has become a mere consultative body to the pope (and the Roman curia) within well-defined and rather narrow limits.31 ing to convictions and habits developed mainly after the Council of Trent. There are few among them who are familiar with the Church of the first millennium, and even fewer are those who wish to return to its practices. Those who in common parlance are called "lib erals" hardly form a cohesive group. Many of them are simply searching honestly for the correct practical implementation of the conciliar vision. Others are "free thinkers" of sorts; they want to propagate the council's vision but do not have enough knowledge to do so within the balancing parameters of the tradition; they easily fall into unacceptable ex cesses. With some simplification it is fair to say that the contemporary struggle between the conservatives and the (faithful) liberals is between the "Tridentines" and the followers of Vatican II. 31 In connection with the papacy there is a thorny issue rarely pondered by theolo gians. We hold as dogma that the pope is the bishop of a diocese (Rome) with the right and duties that such an office involves; in that he is quasi-equal to other bishops. But because The episcopal conferences exist and operate in the shadow of the Roman Curia; they have little room for any creativity. Even the limited freedom granted them by the Code of Canon Law has been reduced by the May 1998 apostolic constitution Apostolos suos to the point where the exercise of their mandate to teach is virtually impossible and where every order needs Roman consent-disguised under the name of "review."* 32
Admittedly, since the council, the role of non-ordained persons (laity) in the internal life of the Church has visibly increased: they are working in chanceries, in ecclesiastical courts, parish councils, and other min istries. For this, we should rejoice. Yet, paradoxically, the new code drew a sharper line between the ordained and the non-ordained than did any law or custom before. Non-ordained cannot share in any way in the power to govern, munus gubernandi, not even by delegation. This ex cludes them from significant decision-making processes that affect the life of the church. This is a restrictive innovation that ignores a contrary tradition.
Legal positivism, canonical nominalism.
In the years after the council and before the promulgation of the new code, there has been a fairly voluminous "wisdom literature" about the role of law in the Church. Presently, an increasing number of textbooks are slipping back to the comfortable position of never asking the laws he succeeds Peter, he also has the office of primacy. In other terms, according to Catholic belief, there is not a "super-bishop" in the church. The pope has the primacy because he is a local bishop-of a privileged place, of course. What is the full meaning of such an arrangement? What does it mean in the practical order? Why did the early church not de cide to follow the usual secular pattern of having one "general supervisor"-with no other burden attached? This is a topic worthy of further exploration; it has its importance not only for the internal government of the Church but also for the progress of the ecumenical movement.
32 It is interesting to note that the doctrine of episcopal collegiality underlying and defining the present status of episcopal conferences is virtually identical with the position of a minority at the council that claimed that effective collegiality exists only when an ec umenical council is in session or in analogous circumstances when the bishops-although dispersed physically-are called by the pope to act in a collegial manner. The majority that voted for collegiality had a much richer understanding of it based on the traditional doctrine of synodality that was operational even in the Western church throughout the first millennium. Affective collegiality is no more genuine and authentic than an affective pri macy would be, as distinct from an effective one as proclaimed by the two Vatican coun cils. To define a theological reality as "affective" is to deny that it is a God given reality: it is to assert that our affections create it. about their link to theological values. Canonical science is drifting to ward an exegesis of the texts that would satisfy the Tridentine censors. It is no wonder the respect for law in the community is not increasing.
The acceptance of an historical existence.
We have stability in canon law: a code provides well for it. But we have no ways and means that are built into the system for the renewal of our laws-as civic communities do. Since the Church is embedded in an evolving universe, and it is an integral part of human history, it must be equipped to handle changes. But we do not have an organ to watch for great movements and propose changes in the law. We let tensions de velop, let one crisis follow another, and even tolerate breakdowns before we reach for the remedy of prudent legislation.
(The inability of our legal system to respond to the sexual abuse crisis in a prompt, fair, and efficient way is an illustration of its rigidity. Supradiocesan institutions, such as episcopal conferences, regional synods, and a "universal synod" would be eminently suitable for identifying problems and proposing new legislation.)
Learning from secular sages.
As we know, in the Middle Ages the study of canon law went hand in hand with the cult of civil law: they shared whatever wisdom they could find. The Reformation and Enlightenment ages put an end to this part nership, and canon law remained alone and did not benefit from signifi cant progress in legal wisdom achieved in civic communities. This con tinues to be the case today.
There are examples are at hand. The procedural norms of the Congre gation for the Doctrine of the Faith have not changed sufficiently since the case of Galileo; we do not really hold, certainly not in practice, that delayed justice is no justice; our ways of protecting human rights in the church are hesitant and often ineffective; we lack good and effective rules for the accountability of office holders; and so forth. 
An in-depth
Conclusion
The council came to an end forty years ago. But the internal struggles that for four distinct seasons animated the meetings and the inter sessions are replayed in the Roman Catholic communion at large. As the council fathers struggled with the process of conversion, the Church at large is doing the same today. The dynamic forces of the Spirit that moved the council are poured out into the whole Church; they are dis-3 3 33 The work would have to be very focused and disciplined, but it could be done in a relatively short time. To identify the theological values relevant for legislation does not re quire a prolonged investigation into every aspect of the institution in question. To under take a thorough "inquiry into theological and human values" would be an immense ser vice to the Church; but to be useful (and to be ready in time) it must be done in a judicious manner. For example, to prepare the reform of the laws regulating the administration of the sacrament of penance, the two principal values can be found easily; they are "the con trite heart of the penitent" and "Christ's forgiving power in the Church." All relevant laws should converge on and support these values. On this basis the present laws could be eval uated, and new ones proposed. Or, the sacred values that a bishop or presbyters must serve are not difficult to identify; teaching, sanctifying, and governing God's people. Are there any leges vigentes that can distract them from such tasks? If so, how to amend them? Or, are there any structures that leave them less than accountable? If so, how to change them? Such a salutary examination of the whole corpus o f canon law is a condicio sine qua non of any authentic renewal o f the law. rupting earlier attitudes and habits, and, yes, causing turmoil. We should have been able to foresee this, but we did not.
To live in our contemporary Church is like being called to be an actor in a drama-of immense proportions. The scene extends as far as the community has spread. The main theme of the play-designated by the council-is to liberate insights and energies present in every part of the Church for the benefit of all. So that they all may be free and all may enjoy a life in abundance. We are not spectators at this drama who are comfortably watching the play. We are participant actors whether we like it or not. The agonies and the ecstasies that a process of conversion en tails touch us deeply-individually and intimately. The drama is not likely to end any time soon. But the outcome can hardly be in doubt: if the Spirit initiated the council, the same Spirit will accomplish the work-in ways that we cannot anticipate.
For the time being, the wise Rabbi, Gamaliel is of good counsel:
. . . If this plan or this undertaking is of human origin, it will fail; if it is of God, you will not be able to overthrow them. You might even be found fighting against God (Acts 5:38-39).34 34 This article ends on a note of hope and on a hope that is well grounded because we have seen the beginning of a process initiated at the council by the Spirit, and because we believe that it is right and just to expect that such a divine gift will unfold. Yet, a question may linger in the mind of the reader: what if the fulfillment of the promise is delayedand will continue to be so? What should we do? After all, we have waited and waited for forty years. We have expected an explosion of life but we were given the silence of im mobility. Quousque Domine?! The response is that the promise o f the Spirit is alive and strong, but the time of its fulfillment has not been revealed to us. We must not depart from Jerusalem [that is from the Church] but must await the promise o f the Father (cf. Acts 1:4). God will speak and act in his own good time. After all, the Church is the people (or the people are the Church), laws and regulations are merely structures to protect life. While we are waiting and hoping for the structural reforms, our principal task may well be to spread around the insights of the council and to do everything for the education of the people-so that one day the prayers, intelligence, and wisdom of the people may provoke the needed changes.
